This is the book to put into the hands of anybody who still thinks that Economic and Monetary Union would be good for Britain or for any other country. John Mills is a very rare person, an economist with business experience in trade and production. In this excellent book, he shows that Economic and Monetary Union would be bad for all our economies.

Experience shows that the more economically integrated the European Union has become, the worse it has performed. From its start in 1958, the original six members had no form of economic or monetary union, and they grew by 5.4% a year. Then in 1972 they created the currency snake; it lasted only until 1976. By 1974, economic growth had ceased. After the snake expired, growth resumed: 4.9% in 1976, 3% in 1977-80.

They created the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 and it lasted until 1993. The ERM slowed growth and raised unemployment across the EU: growth was only 1.7% a year; unemployment averaged 7% and inflation 7.8%. Even so, we joined, because the whole establishment wanted us to, not because the people wanted to. Polls in 1989 showed that 93% of the Chief Executives of large British companies and City institutions believed that we should join the ERM. We joined in October 1990: during our two-year membership unemployment rose by 1.4 million and national output fell; manufacturing output fell by 7% and manufacturing jobs by 14%. It was worse for us even than for the rest of the EU.

In the same period, the rest of the world grew by 3.2%, proving that the EU's slow growth was not due to world conditions. The ERM was the main cause of the EU-wide recession: from 1990 to 1993, growth ceased altogether. After ERM expired, growth resumed: 2.9% in 1994, 2.4% in 1995. But implementing the Maastricht criteria for EMU slowed growth again and raised unemployment. EU unemployment is now 12%, 30 million, according to ILO figures.

What would entering Economic and Monetary Union mean for us? It would mean deflation, higher unemployment, slump. It would also mean the end of Britain's independence. Politics and economics are indivisible. The arguments for constitutional, economic and political independence are one. The experiment of making the Bank of England independent has clearly failed: we should call on the Government to reassert control of interest rates. This is a political demand, a constitutional demand, and an economic demand.

Under EMU, eight unelected European Central Bankers would control our currency, and as Keynes said, "Whoever controls the currency, controls the Government." To make EMU credible to the markets, they would keep interest rates high, imposing deflation. This would mean higher unemployment and taxes, lower wages and lower public spending.

The Gold Standard was a way of trying to fix currency values together. It failed disastrously, ending in the Great Crash. Economic growth ceased. After the Gold Standard expired, growth resumed. In 1931, Britain left the Gold Standard, devaluing by 24%; money supply rose by 34%; interest rates were about zero, and there was some tariff protection. Labour's 'Iron Chancellor' Philip Snowden said leaving the Gold Standard "would reduce the standard of living of the workman by 50%." What actually happened? From 1932 to 1937, manufacturing output rose 58%; 2.7 million new jobs were created (1.3 million in manufacturing); growth averaged 3.8% a year, and living standards rose. Lower interest rates brought a boom in house-building.

By contrast, the French Government stayed in the Gold Standard and kept the franc overvalued: GDP fell by 17%, industrial production by a quarter, until the Popular Front Government devalued the franc.

This Government claims that the way to restore industry's competitiveness is to invest in skill. But this will not restore manufacturing while there is still not enough demand in the economy. The present regime of tight money and high interest rates, leading to a high exchange rate, doesn't work. It's like putting on the brakes when you're going up hill. An overpriced pound means dear exports and cheap imports: in the first quarter of 1998, our goods trade gap was £4.7 billion, the worst since 1990.

The remedy does not lie in reforming the labour market or the public sector. To stimulate output and employment, we need more demand, higher wages and more public spending. Supply-side reforms, better education, more information technology, may improve efficiency and productivity, but without an expansion of demand this can lead not to growth but to more unemployment and unused resources.

The Maastricht Treaty which set up EMU has only money and budget targets, there are no real world targets, for full employment or higher growth. It is innately deflationary: those not meeting the targets must deflate, yet those meeting them do not have to reflate. A Treaty cannot be reformed; it can only be accepted or rejected. Sir Nigel Wicks, Chair of the EU Monetary Committee says, "I would not regard monetary policy as an instrument for solving unemployment." We who have experienced decades of monetarism in action regard that as an understatement. EMU is monetarism on a European scale; it is Thatcherism on a European scale.

We need lower interest rates to fund projects fitting in to our plans for rebuilding Britain. We need lower taxes on jobs. We need taxes on capital: tax Murdoch, not toady to him. We need to legislate so that pension funds, which are heavily subsidised by taxpayers, are required to invest in British industry and services. The Government could promote investments with a high social rate of return. We need to reimpose controls on speculators. But we can't do these jobs when in EMU: EMU forbids them all.

We need to keep out of EMU. Joining would clearly be bad for our health. Then we will rebuild Britain as a self-reliant, industrial and sovereign nation.

John Pinder is a major authority in the literature of the European Union and its evolution from the European Coal and Steel Community. Pinder, traces the history of Western Europe after the Second World War. He describes the accounts of the Europeans as they deal with post war life and the zealousness of creating an institution that would becaome the European union of today. From the small roots of the ECSC to the expansion into the social aspects of life to poltical expasnion and to geographical exspanion, Pinder gives detailed expalations. I highly recommend this book.

I think this book explains very well how the economic integration in the Europe affects on the Korean consumer electronics firms. In particular, the empirical survey is very useful for not only Korean firms but also firms in other less developed countries, which consider to make FDIs in the Europe.

For anybody interested in the "nuts and bolts" of EU legislation and case law relating to Community labour law and social policy this book is a must. To understand the ongoing social dialogue at European level is even for experts hard to master. The author has managed to put together key material, both for the law student and the practitioner, to produce a comprehensive and informative sourcebook which makes compulsory reading for anybody interested in this field.

Member countries of the EU are inevitably forming an increasingly integrated society. This integration has extended to the field of planning as well. The European Spatial Development Perspective, which was developed to address planning issues across the continent, is analyzed and documented in this book, based on a symposium led by Faludi in 2001. The essays in the volume should be of interest to planners in America, as we face many of the same problems and issues that our European counterparts are dealing with--sprawl, congestion, environmental concerns, inner-city economic decline--and as we figure out how to cross local, state, and regional boundaries for effective decision-making and consensus-building. What is striking to me is that, in this age of global competition, the EU is now actively dealing with spatial planning and development--something US politicians and leaders are slower in doing. I found Faludi's volume intriguing and the subject well worth investigating.

The star of this collection is clearly Howorth, who has clearly spent a good deal of his energies lately focusing on matters of integration and union. And clearly such unions, after a half-century--actually 51-years to be precise--of isolationism a great deal of work and study will be required to bring together forces of such disparate backgrounds. If anyone can propse a plan of attack it is Howorth. The flap copy says that Howorth "fills a surprising gap." No one who knows the subjects could possibly disagree. Howorth (again in the words fo the book) "outlines the tortuous history of attempts to . . . [achieve] European integration and highlights some recents initiatives," though one senses there may be other initiatives that the public account does not provide, which is only fitting. One can only hope that he extends his often brilliant efforts to an American model.

Ms. Cherry's *Exiled Heart* deserves any accolade one can muster: moving, extraordinary, strikingly intelligent, and--yes--heartbreaking. Ms. Cherry's meditations upon fate's intrusions into love are a balance of braininess and passion.

Steve Vivian

This is the most brilliant book on Gogol that I have read. Appealing to the layperson and Gogol scholar alike, it weaves textual analysis, biography, and cultural and literary history into an insightful, integrated and often surprising analysis of Gogol's work.

In 1951, Westbrook Pegler wrote numerous articles attacking Margaret Bourke-White for her associations with leftist politics in the 1930s. It is probably for this reason that in her autobiography, Portrait of Myself, written about ten years later, Bourke-White didn't mention her first book, Eyes on Russia, published in 1931. And yet, this book is of extraordinary interest, not only as a landmark in Bourke-White's career but also as a source, both visual and narrative, on the Soviet Union during its first Five Year Plan. With letters of recommendation from influential people, including the Russian film maker, Sergei Eisenstein, Bourke-White arrived in Moscow in the fall of 1930, where she obtained the official endorsement of A.B. Khalatoff, chief of the Soviet publishing house (he was later liquidated in the 1937 purges). Khalatoff supplied her with a thick roll of rubles and a guide. Bourke-White then toured some of the most important industrial and other sites and came back with stellar images of Russia under construction, which she complemented by a spritely and charming narrative of her experiences as the first foreign photographer to photograph in the Soviet Union with official permission. On her trip, she made 800 negatives, of which 40 were published in Eyes on Russia in a sepia tone. This book, along with at least eight related illustrated articles in Fortune, the New York Times Sunday Magazine, and other periodicals, significantly enhanced Bourke-White's reputation (and commercial business). They also helped initiate relationships she established both with Soviet officials and Americans sympathetic to the U.S.S.R. She returned to Russia in 1931 and 1932 for additional photography, but Eyes on Russia, a fascinating book for a variety of reasons, remains the largest single published collection of her work in that country. It was very well received in numerous book reviews when it appeared. For a more detailed review, see my article, "Margaret Bourke-White: Eyes on Russia," The Photo Review, 22: 3-4 (Summer & Fall 1999).

This book is similar in approach to the better known heaven and Hell by Bruce Lincoln. However, Billington concentartes more on the art and includes a beautiful section of plates. Unlike Lincoln's book, it is easily approached and is a reasonable 260 pages. Billington shows the connections between Russia's spiritual, historical and political traditions have played a direct role in defining its cultural and artistic production. He profiles individual artists and art forms. The painting of Rublev and the medieval stile on firewood, the architect Rastrelli, Gogol, Mussorsgki and Eisenstein primarily. the main point is that Russians learned from others, imitated and then transformed the art into a uniqe interpretation that reflected their reality that is often more ambitious and beautiful. anyone who's heard Rachmaninov's 2nd piano concerto or seen a painting by Repin should have no problem sahring this view.